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UNITED STATES V. FORDICE AND THE
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION: GROPING FOR ROOT
AND BRANCH
For a time, hopes were raised, but eventually the search was aban-
doned. The children were never found . . . Gradually, all in the
community came to realize the tragedy's lamentable lesson. In the
monumental school desegregation struggle, the intended beneficiar-
ies had been forgotten long before they were lost.'
In Derrick Bell's study of the elusive quest for racial justice, And
We Are Not Saved, his fictional heroine, Geneva Crenshaw, recounts
"The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren," a fable about
the bitter fruits of the attempt to impose a court-supervised remedy
upon a segregated public school system.' After years of delay and
negotiation to arrive at a plan calling for a "full measure" of racial
balance in the schools, implementation day dawned. 3 Initially, city
officials viewed school desegregation as a panacea for the ills of urban
ghetto life: early dropouts; unemployment; teen pregnancy; and too
much exposure to crime, drugs and alcohol.` But the plan itself, which
would achieve equal racial balance by shutting down dilapidated
schools in predominantly black neighborhoods and busing large num-
bers of black students to schools in mainly white areas that were
suddenly the beneficiaries of windfall funding, pleased nobody.' Black
parents, whose children attended the W.E.B. DuBois School, which had
become a model for black excellence in education for the nation,
launched a vigorous protest." These parents urged that they had im-
plemented their own remedy for inferior black schools and that the
court-ordered remedy would be more harmful than requiring students
to attend segregated schools.' Only when the black students simply
vanished before the plan could be implemented did the citizens realize
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL. JUSTICE 107
(1987).
2 Id. at 7, 102-07.
3 Id. at 102.
4 Id. at 103.
5 Id. at 103-05.
BELL supra note 1, at 104.
7 Id.
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that students and education had become the casualties rather than
beneficiaries of the desegregation remedy. 8
It has been thirty-nine years since the United States Supreme
Court declared in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education
("Brown I") that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
`separate but equal' has no place."' In his second opinion in the Brown
case ("Brown II"), Chief Justice Warren asserted the authority of the
courts to use their equitable powers in the fashioning of appropriate
remedies to desegregate schools "with all deliberate speed."'" After
Brown, judges, usually lower court judges, were invested with the re-
sponsibility for a wide range of educational policy decisions, which they
doubted they could make without overreaching their areas of compe-
tence. 11
Although the mandate of Brown I and the remedial power of
Brown II extended to the entire field of public education, when the
Supreme Court has reviewed desegregation plans in light of these
landmark decisions, it has done so chiefly in the context of elementary
and secondary school systerns.' 2 At the elementary and secondary level,
the Court has insisted that a school district has an "affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."ts
In the four decades since Brown, federal courts have been unanimous
in holding that the affirmative duty to dismantle racially segregated
school systems also applies in the context of higher education.' 4 There
has, however, been significant disagreement in the lower courts on the
question of whether the scope of this affirmative duty is as broad when
applied to colleges and universities as the standard that has been
defined in the context of elementary and secondary education.' 5
On June 26, 1992, when the Supreme Court handed down its
8 1d. at 107.
9 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
1 ° Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
"See, e.g., Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch. & Coil. Auth., 289 F. Supp.
784, 788 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
12 See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1435 (1992); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526, 529 (1979); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301 (1977); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist, No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 191
& n.2 (1973); Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Green v. County
Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8 (1958).
13 Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
"Ayers v. Allah', 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1551 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
15 Id. at 1552.
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opinion in United States v. Fordice,'' it brought to a close a litigation
which spanned seventeen years, including twelve years of court-super-
vised negotiations, a five-week bench trial in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, during which the court
heard testimony from seventy-one witnesses and received 56,700 pages
of evidence, and two opinions by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.° In holding that the State of Mississippi had failed
to meet its affirmative obligation to dismantle its prior de jure segre-
gated system of higher education, the Supreme Court established for
the first time that the same standard of compliance will apply at all
levels of public education.' 8 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case
to the district court to exercise its authority to mandate appropriate
remedial action.'"
Initially, the Fordice decision was hailed as a civil rights landmark. 2 '
In recent months, however, Judge Neil Biggers, in compliance with the
Supreme Court remand, has been evaluating a state proposal calling
for the closing of one historically black college, Mississippi Valley State
University, and the merging of another, Alcorn State University, with a
historically white institution.2 ' If adopted, the remedy may have the
ironic consequence of destroying the very institutions of higher edu-
cation that sustained black students during segregation in the effort to
combat its vestiges. 22 The decision in Fordice should thus recall Derrick
Bell's "Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black School Children," in which
well-meaning courts and school boards struggled to achieve racial
justice while the intended beneficiaries were forgotten."
Iti 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
17 The three lower court opinions are recorded as follows: Ayers v. Allah], 674 F. Supp. 1523
(N.D. Miss. 1987); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990) (panel); Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d
676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane). The opinions will be referred to hereafter as Ayers I, Ayers //and
Ayers III respectively.
18 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2732, 2743.
19 Id. at 2743.
20 See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Court Sees Broad Duty to Erase College Bias, WAsti, Posy, June 27,
1992, at Al. Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr called the decision "a magnificent victory for the
United States." Id. David Tatel, a former civil rights official in the Carter administration, described
it as a "very strong affirmation of the principles of Brown.... I think in the end it's a very, very
good development for improving higher education opportunities for blacks in the South." Id.
2t Transcript of Proceedings Before the Judge Neal B. Biggers, Jr., United States District
Judge: Oral Presentation/Status Conference (Oct. 22, 1992) in '2 THE. AYERS DECISION (not
paginated) (Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning) [hereinafter AYERS
DECISIONT; Stephen C. Halpern, A Bedeviling and Worrisome Court Ruling on Black Colleges,
OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 4, 1992, at B1.
22 Fordice, 112 S. CI. at 2746 (Thomas, J„ concurring).
23 BELL, supra note 1, at 107.
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This Note argues that the courts, in their quest for racial justice
in Mississippi higher education, may eventually impose a remedy, the
closure of one historically black institution and the loss of identity of
a second, which is not only harmful to its intended beneficiaries, but
which violates a strong national legislative policy calling for the
strengthening of historically black colleges and the distinctive oppor-
tunities they provide. Section I discusses the mandate of Brown v. Board
of Education and the courts' exercise of remedial authority in the
context of elementary and secondary education. 24 Section II discusses
the debate in the lower courts about the applicability of the Brown
standard to segregated systems of higher education and the uneven
enforcement of that standard in different jurisdictions. 25 Section III
describes the evolution of Mississippi's de jure dual system of higher
education and the Ayers v. Allain decision, which held that a state
meets its affirmative duty to dismantle its segregated system of colleges
and universities by adopting good faith race-neutral policies.26 Section
IV presents the decision in United States v. Fardice, its extension of the
Brown affirmative duty to higher education, and the limited guidance
it offers to lower courts in the crafting of remedies which will meet
that standard. 27 Section V analyzes two distinct remedial approaches:
one mandating administrative measures to achieve a mathematical
racial balancing; and the other focusing upon the creation of educa-
tional programs and enhanced opportunities for those who have been
victimized by segregated school systems. 28 Section VI predicts that the
closure remedy proposed in United States v. Fordice may usher in a new
wave of litigation over the desegregation of public higher education,
as courts in sixteen other states grope for more equitable remedies
than the one provided by the Supreme Court. 29 It concludes by pro-
posing that a remedy involving increased access to quality education
and the enhancement of the historically black universities will be
preferable to efforts to achieve a mathematical racial balance by shut-
ting down institutions that continue to fulfill a vital mission.s°
24 See infra notes
25 See infra notes
26 See infra notes
27 See infra notes
28 See infra notes
a See infra notes
" See infra notes
31-73 and accompanying text.
74-135 and accompanying text.
136-201 and accompanying text
202-263 and accompanying text.
264-307 and accompanying text.
308-324 and accompanying text,
325-327 and accompanying text.
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I. BROWN AND ITS PROGENY: THE FASHIONING OF DESEGREGATION
REMEDIES IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
A. Brown v. Board of Education and the Supreme Court Mandate
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place.s'
In the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I') the
Supreme Court held that separate educational facilities were inher-
ently unequal, and that children required to attend segregated schools
had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendments' It found precedent for its decision in a
number of cases involving unequal programs and facilities in higher
education." The Court asserted that separate educational facilities had
generated a sense of inferiority in the "hearts and minds" of black
schoolchildren, and that it must be the goal of any judicial relief to
erase that stigma.'" Because the opinion represented a response to four
different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware,
premised on different facts and different local conditions, the Court
postponed the consideration of "appropriate relief' and invited the
submission of briefs on the subject of remedies by the Attorney General
of the United States and the Attorneys General of the states that had
permitted the segregation,ss
In its 1955 opinion in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown II'),
the Supreme Court vested primary responsibility for evaluating
whether local school boards were implementing good faith desegrega-
tion plans in the courts that originally heard the cases."'' In fashioning
their decrees, the courts were to be guided by "equitable principles":
51 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
52 Id.
55 M. at 492. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U,S. 337 (1938) (Court ordered
immediate admission of black student to all-white law school because state did not provide law
school for black students); Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (hastily established law school
fir black students did not provide them with equal protection because the facility was clearly
inferior in resources, faculty, reputation and accreditation to the all-white University of Texas Law
School); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black student admitted to
previously all-white graduate school, but forced to sit in designated separate seats in library,
classrooms and cafeteria was denied equal protection).
54 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
s.5
	 at 495-96. The three cases in addition to Brown were: Briggs v. Elliott., 98 E Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951); Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va.
1952); Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). Id. at 486-88 11.1.
56 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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"Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these
traditional attributes of equity power."37 ChiefJustice Warren suggested
that the courts were free to consider a range of problem areas: admini-
stration; the physical condition of school plants; the school transpor-
tation system; personnel; rezoning of school districts; systems for de-
termining student admission on a nonracial basis; and revision of local
laws and regulations." Beyond these hints at the exercise of equitable
powers, Brown II offered neither standards by which to measure com-
pliance with the constitutional principle of Brown I, nor a timetable
for compliance other than "with all deliberate speed."39
B. "Freedom of Choice" Is Not an End in Itself
Among the most frequently employed forms of southern resis-
tance to active desegregation of school systems were tuition grants to
private schools, school closings, student transfer privileges, and above
all, the implementation of freedom of choice plans. 4 ' In the 1968
case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, the Supreme
Court held that the school board's implementation of a freedom of
choice plan was an insufficient step to make the transition to a unitary
school system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.42 The fact that the Board had opened the doors of the
former "white" school to Negro children, and of the "Negro" school
to white children was simply the beginning of the inquiry, not an end
in itself. 4s
The decision in Green marked a significant expansion of the man-
date in Brown II by insisting that the scope of the school board's
37 Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
38 Id. at 300-01.
39 See id. at 298-301.
40 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968).
41 Gail M. Epstein, Desegregation of Public Institutions of Higher Education: Merger as a Remedy,
56 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 701, 703 & n.13 (1980).
42 Green, 391 U.S. at 441, 438.
43 Id. at 437. New Kent County is a rural county in Eastern Virginia. Id. at 432. Its population
of about 4,500 in 1968 was equally divided between black and white residents; there was no
residential racial segregation. Id. Prior to the implementation of the freedom of choice plan, the
system had one white combined elementary and high school—New Kent—and one black com-
bined elementary and high school—George W. Watkins. Id. The county maintained this segre-
gated system under the compulsion of Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions mandating
racial segregation in public education. Id. The Court found that after three years of operation
under the freedom of choice plan, 85% of the black students remained at Watkins, and that not
a single white student had yet elected to attend the all-black school. Id. at 441.
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affirmative duty was to eradicate every vestige of previous racial dis-
crimination, and to come forward with a desegregation plan that would
work immediately." As to the remedies that this and other school boards
might employ to meet their affirmative duty, the decision reinforced
the district courts' authority to exercise flexible equitable powers ac-
cording to the circumstances of the case. 45 The Court insisted that
there could be no universal remedy that would do the job in every
case, but that each plan must be tailored according to the specific
alternatives that would bring relief in each individual situation.° In
Green, the remedy that the Court offered for consideration was zoning,
an administrative approach that realistically promised to fulfill the
specific desegregation goal in New Kent County, by creating a system
"without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."''
Although the Court in Green invalidated the freedom of choice
plan in this particular situation, Justice Brennan indicated in dicta that
the Court was not prepared to hold that freedom of choice plans were
in themselves unconstitutional.° Instead, Justice Brennan suggested
that the Court might yet approve of freedom of choice plans in situ-
ations where they offered genuine promise of remedying segregation.°
After the decision in Green, freedom of choice continued to be an
ongoing defense for reticent school boards, particularly in the context
of higher education where attendance itself was by choice. 5°
C. The Nature of the Violation Determines the Scope of the Remedy 5 I
In two opinions issued in the 1970s, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education and Milliken v. Bradley, the United States Supreme
Court provided a more expansive discussion of the specific remedies
that might fall within a district court's equitable powers, as well as a
44 See id. at 438-39.
45 1d. at 439.
46 1d.
47 Green, 391 U.S. at 442. Because New Kent County was not residentially segregated, it was
able to achieve a "unitary, non-racial system" with relative ease simply by dividing the county in
two and sending students living in the eastern half to New Kent School and students living in the
western half to Watkins. Id. at 442 n.6. The petitioners in the case, parents of black schoolchil-
dren, advanced a more efficient remedy, making one facility the elementary school for the whole
county and the other facility the secondary school, Id. Thc Court only included this suggestion
in a footnote to its opinion. Id.
46 Id. at 439.
4'3
	 at 440.
50 See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 384, 407 (1986); Ayers 1, (174 E. Supp. 1523, 1525
(N.D. Miss. 1987); Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch, and College Au th,, 289 F.
Supp. 784, 788 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (three :judge court), affd, 393 U.S. 400 (19(19) [hereinafter
ASIA] .
61 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 1(1 (1971).
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limitation upon the scope of the remedial power. 55 In the 1971 case of
Swann, the Court held that the varied remedial techniques imposed
by a district court order were reasonable, feasible, workable and well
within the court's power to provide equitable relief." In the Court's
view, where there has been a denial of a constitutional right, the
judicial power to devise remedies must be broad enough to eliminate
the effects of the violation." In this situation, the Court decided that
it was well within the traditional authority of the school board to
determine that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society, they should be required to attend schools with a mathematical
ratio of black to white students that matched the proportion for the
district as a whole.55
 The Court thus acknowledged the achievement of
racial balancing or racial quotas as an appropriate correction for a
previously segregated system. 56
 To achieve this end, it approved an
array of measures, including: the calculation of mathematical ratios as
a starting point in the shaping of a remedy; 57
 the imposition of a
burden on the school board to justify the continuing racial identifiabil-
ity of any school in the district;56
 the gerrymandering of attendance
zones;" a sweeping transportation plan;G° and the authority to make
recommendations concerning future construction as well as the dosing
of existing schools to achieve racial balance. 61
In the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken I"), the Court
invoked the principle that the scope of the remedy was to be deter-
52 See id. at 22-31; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737-47 (1974) [ hereinafter Milliken I);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 269-88 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken II).
53
 Swann, 402 U.S. at 30, 31. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, the forty-third largest
in the United States had been segregated by law prior to the decision in Brown I. See id. at 5-6.
In 1965, the school system implemented a court-approved desegregation plan, including geo-
graphic zoning and free pupil transfers, to meet its affirmative duty to achieve a unitary school
system. Id. at 7. By 1969, more than two-thirds of Charlotte's 21,000 black students continued to
attend schools that were more than 99% black. Id. All parties to the subsequent litigation agreed
that the Board of Education had failed to meet its affirmative duty. Id.
54 See id. at 16. The Court went on to evaluate the district court's remedial response to four
problem areas; 1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may be used as an clement in a
remedial order to correct a previously segregated system; 2) whether every all-negro and all-white
school must be eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial process of desegregation; 3)
what the limits are, if any, on the arrangement of school districts and attendance zones as a
remedial measure; and 4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transportation facilities to
correct state-enforced racial segregation. Id. at 22.
55 Id. at 16.
See id. at 22-25.
Id. at 25.
as Swann, 402 U.S. at 26.
5•  See id. at 28.
50 1d. at 29-30.
MI Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
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mined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation in order
to invalidate an interdistrict desegregation remedy imposed by a dis-
trict court upon the metropolitan Detroit area." The Court found
ample evidence of de jure segregation in the Detroit schools only;
therefore, to impose a consolidation order upon the area's fifty-three
other school districts would be an impermissible remedy.° The Court
went on to distinguish the circumstances in the Detroit school system
from those addressed in Green and Swann, where the elimination of
racially identifiable schools was an appropriate goal.° Here, the Court
urged that school authorities, instead of seeking a mathematical racial
balancing of students, should seek remedies that would "restore the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct."° Three years later, in
Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken II"), when the Court evaluated a desegre-
gation plan limited to the Detroit school system, it asserted that on
occasion, remedies other than student assignment must be invoked to
eliminate the effects of prior discrimination.° Justice Marshall, in his
concurring opinion, placed the emphasis not on racial ratios, but upon
the ways a segregated system had impaired the academic development
of black students.° Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's
authority to mandate a full range of educational reforms, including:
the implementation of thirteen remedial or compensatory programs;
the introduction of bilingual education and a multiethnic curriculum;
in-service training for teachers on the debilitating effects of racial
discrimination; increased counselling and career guidance for stu-
dents; and a reevaluation of the use of standardized testing procedures
which were infected with bias. 6" The Court reasoned that each of these
programs was essential "to restore the victims of discriminatory con-
duct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct."°
In sum, the United States Supreme Court, in the decades follow-
ing Brown I and Brown II, imposed an affirmative duty upon local
school boards to implement sweeping desegregation plans at the ele-
mentary and secondary levels. 7" The Court in Green also established
62 Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 752 (1974).
66 Id. at 745,
64 Id. at 746.
65 Id.
_ 66
 Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977).
67 Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., concurring).
66 Id., at 272-77, 272 n.4.
69 Id. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746).
70 Epstein, ,supra note 41, at 701.
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the chief inquiry about whether a state had fulfilled this affirmative
duty: had there been a transition to a unitary school system in which
racial discrimination had been eliminated root and branch? 71 Both
Swann and Milliken demonstrated the sweep of the district courts'
equitable powers to mandate remedies in local school districts. 72 While
these cases did not address the desegregation of colleges and univer-
sities, the remedies that they implemented at the elementary and
secondary levels laid the foundation for lower court decisions involving
the desegregation of public higher education:73
II. THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: A REVIEW
OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Higher education is neither free nor compulsory. Students choose
which, if any, institution they will attend. 74
A. ASTA and Norris: The Paths Diverge
In the 1968 case of Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama
Public School and College Authority ("ASTA"), the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama declined to exercise its
equitable power to impose a desegregation remedy upon a dual system
of higher education. 75
 The plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent
the state from constructing and operating a degree-granting branch of
Auburn University in Montgomery on the grounds that the expansion
of an identifiably "white" institution would have an adverse effect upon
the desegregation efforts of predominantly black Alabama State Col-
lege, also located in Montgomery. 76
 The court acknowledged that the
71 See id. at 703,
72 Compare Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 22-31 (1971) (use of mathematical quotas, remedial altering
of attendance zones and transportation of students to achieve racial balance) with Millikerz II,
433 U.S. at 269-88 (use of remedial educational programs, curricular reform and teacher training
to end discrimination).
73 See Epstein, supra note 41, at 703-04.
74 ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 788.
75 Id. at 787. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama had in the
previous year heard a case involving segregated colleges. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.) affd sob nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). Id. But
ASTA was the first case to challenge the court's preparedness to do snore than simply declare
segregation in higher education to be illegal and order nondiscriminatory admissions. Id.
76 Id. at 785, 789. The plaintiff, ASTA, was a non-profit corporation whose membership
consisted of approximately 10,000 black teachers, a majority of whom were graduates of Alabama
State College. Id. at 786. The defendant, Alabama Public School and College Authority, had been
authorized under Alabama Acts 1967 No. 403 to sell and issue bonds in the amount of $5,000,000
for the purpose of establishing, constructing and maintaining the new Auburn campus. See id.
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state was under an affirmative duty to dismantle its dual system of
higher education, but rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the scope
of the duty should be extended as far in public higher education as it
had been in the elementary and secondary school context. 77 The court
observed that Auburn University was already complying with a court
order to admit all qualified black students consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this good
faith effort to ensure race-neutral policies and students' freedom of
choice was sufficient to meet the basic requirement of the affirmative
duty to dismantle a segregated college system. 78
The court rested its decision on two arguments: one concerning
the fundamental distinction between elementary and secondary
schools, and higher education; and the other questioning judicial
competence to make sweeping educational policy decisions for col-
leges and universities. 7• The court observed that elementary and sec-
ondary schools had traditionally been both free and compulsory."
School boards could assign students to specific facilities on the princi-
ple that at any given grade level schools substantially resembled each
other in their goals, curriculum, physical plant and faculty. 8 ' In that
limited context with relatively fixed standards, the courts could review
decisions concerning the construction or expansion of schools when
mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment without overreaching their
area of competence." On the other hand, according to the court,
higher education was neither free nor compulsory, and colleges and
universities were not fungible." Students were required to choose
which, if any, institution to attend; this freedom to choose from the
full array of educational goals, facilities, curricula and living arrange-
ments advanced the beneficial function of matching different students
to the right schools for them. 84
 The court concluded that in the state-
wide context, with a complicated mix of diverse institutions, judicial
review of school construction or expansion decisions to see whether
they maximized desegregation would mark an intrusion upon policy
areas where the court lacked expertise." When the United States Su-
77 1d. at 787.
78 hi. at 789-90.
ASTA, 289 E Supp. al 787-88.
8° Id.
81
 Id. at 788.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 AS 1'A, 289 F. Supp. at 788, 790.
Id. at 788.
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preme Court was asked to review ASTA in 1969, it summarily affirmed
the decision in a memorandum decision with two Justices dissenting."
By contrast, in the 1971 case of Norris v. State Council of Higher
Education for Virginia, a three-judge district court held that the Su-
preme Court's charge to eliminate discrimination in public education
root and branch "defined a constitutional duty owed as well to college
students."N7
 The court urged that even though the remedies employed
to eliminate discrimination in elementary and secondary schools
might differ from those invoked in colleges, the state's duty was just as
exacting. 88 Having so stated, the Norris court embraced the identical
remedy that the ASTA court felt was beyond its competence: the review
and ultimate injunction against the expansion of an identifiably white
institution in close proximity to a historically black college. 89
Initially, the Norris court challenged the precedential value of the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in ASTA.9(1 But finally, the Norris
court distinguished its similar facts from those in the Alabama case. 9 '
In ASTA, the state was seeking to create a new branch campus that
would have no history of racial identifiability, whereas in Norris, Bland
College had a ten-year history as an all-white institution with an all-
white faculty. 92
 The court also attempted to distinguish ASTA by citing
Auburn University's and the state's good faith compliance with the
court desegregation order, even though it acknowledged that the State
of Virginia was already meeting the identical good faith burden.°
Finally, the court granted the injunction preventing the escalation of
81 ' See Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch. and College Audi., 393 U.S. 400
(Douglas and Harlan, -(l., dissenting) (1969).
87 327 F. Stipp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1971) aff'd sub nom. Board of Visitors of the College of
William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971).
88 Id.
89 Id.; ASTA, 289 F. Stipp. at 790.
Norris, 327 F. Stipp. at 1372. "We cannot subscribe to the proposition that the Supreme
Court represented in a one sentence memorandum decision that it approved every statement in
the district court's opinion .... [R]emoved from its context, it does not furnish a universal
definition of a state's obligation to abolish a racially dual system of higher education." Id.
91 /d. at 1372. The plaintiffs in Norris included students and faculty of historically black
Virginia State College near Petersburg. Id. at 1369. They sought to enjoin the State Council of
Higher Education from expanding predominantly white Richard Bland College, located seven
miles away, from a two-year facility to a four-year institution. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the
duplication of programs at the two schools would frustrate Virginia State's efforts to attract white
students and would this perpetuate the state's racially identifiable dual system of higher educa-
tion. Id. at 1371.
92 Id. at 1372. The court does mention, but then gives little weight to the fact that Auburn
University as a whole was a historically white institution. Id.
Id. at 1372, 1373.
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the program at Bland College, but it denied the plaintiff's request for
the full merger of Bland's facilities with Virginia State."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Norris decision in
1971, again without opinion. 95 In a lengthy dissent to the district court's
holding in Norrisjudge Walter E. Hoffman observed that the majority
was committing the State of Virginia to a doctrine of racial balancing
in institutions of higher education that was likely to have harmful
consequences to black and white students alike. 96
 He observed that if
racial balancing were the only goal to be sought by judicial desegrega-
tion remedies, then the simplest procedure for dismantling Virginia's
dual system of higher education would be to "phase out" the state's
predominantly black colleges and "absorb" the students into the re-
maining institutions."
B. Geier and United States v. Louisiana: Merger—
The "Drastic Remedy" 98
In the higher education decisions since ASIA and Norris, federal
courts generally have taken the path running from Green v. County
School Board through Norris, which affirms their authority to invoke
any remedy that lies within the "traditional bounds of equitable re-
lief.'" The Geier decisions, spanning eighteen years of litigation over
the dual system of higher education in Tennessee, resulted in the
merger of Tennessee State University and a branch campus of the
University of Tennessee in Nashville, with Tennessee State as the "sur-
viving" institution."' The facts in Geier are by now familiar; private
94 Id. at 1373.
95 See Board of Visitors v Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971). Certainly, the small factual differences
between ASTA and Norris do plausibly justify different holdings that the Supreme Court could
affirm without inconsistency. But the fact that the two cases in their reasoning take diametrically
opposed views of the affirmative duty to eliminate segregation in public higher education does
raise the question of what exactly the Supreme Court "affirms" in its summary opinions and what
precedernial value should be accorded such opinions. SeeJouN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL Law §2.5 (4th ed. 1991). In any event, the summary affirmances in ASTA and
Norris were not calculated to provide Federal district and circuit courts with guidance in the
desegregation cases that immediately followed. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 707-08.
96 Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1374-82 (1-Ioffinanj, dissenting).
97 1d. at 1375.
as
	 v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp, 644, 660 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
" See, e.g., Geier v. Alexander, 801 1?2d 799, 802 (lith Cir. 1986) (quoting Geier v. University
of Tenn., 597 F.241 1056, 1068 (6th Cir. 1979)).
I" See Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2(1 at 800, 801. The other opinions involved in this litigation
are: Geier v. University of Tenn. 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979), col. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1970);
Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); Geier v. Dunn, 337 F Supp. 573 (M.D.
Tenn. 1973); Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp, 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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plaintiffs brought an action seeking to enjoin the University of Ten-
nessee from constructing a new facility to expand its branch campus
in Nashville into a degree-granting institution.'°' They argued that the
expansion would perpetuate the state's dual system of higher educa-
tion by harming the efforts of Tennessee State University to desegre-
gate its student body and faculty.'°2 The court denied the requested
relief, but did order the parties to submit plans designed to effect
meaningful desegregation of public higher education, with particular
attention to Tennessee State University. 103
 When, after eight years of
exchanging unsatisfactory plans, the enrollment at Tennessee State
remained more than ninety-nine percent black, the court ordered the
"drastic remedy" of the merger of the University of Tennessee-Nashville
into Tennessee State.'"
The Geier court justified the imposition of the merger relying on
traditional equitable principles, balancing the various interests in-
volved, evaluating the feasibility of any proposed remedy, but above all
tailoring the "gravity" of the remedy to the "gravity" of the constitu-
tional violations to be corrected.'°5
 Significantly, the defendants in the
Geier litigation stipulated to the merger and a range of other affirma-
tive obligations before the court issued its decree. 1 °6
 In reducing choice
in public higher education in Nashville to a single integrated option,
the court settled upon an administratively efficient remedy that took
racial balancing as its primary goal, but it left important questions of
educational policy unanswered.°7 Chief among these were: whether
the merger would lead to the dismantlement of the segregated system
of public higher education; and whether historically black institutions
of higher education such as Tennessee State University could avoid
101
 Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d at 800. The original party plaintiffs included black parents
and students, and faculty members from both institutions. Sanders, 288 F. Supp. at 939. Shortly
after the action commenced, the United States intervened as a party plaintiff requesting that the
court order the state to provide a comprehensive plan "calculated to produce meaningful
desegregation of the public universities of Tennessee." See id.
102
 Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d at 800.
1 °3 Id. at 800-01. The court denied the injunction, concluding (incorrectly as it turned out),
that the University of Tennessee had no intention of converting the Nashville campus into a
degree-granting institution. Id. at 800.
104 Id. at 801, 802.
105 See id. at 801-02.
106 7d. at 802. That the court struggled for and achieved this consent marks a significant
tempering of discretionary power when compared to the merger proposed in Louisiana and
Fordice, where there has as yet. been no consensus about the remedies. See infra notes 256-63 and
accompanying text.
1 °7 See Epstein, supra note 41, at 723-28.
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deterioration of their facilities and programs only if white students
could be compelled to attend thena.'°8
Similarly, in the 1989 case of United States v. Louisiana, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana overrode a
Special Master's Report and ordered that the Southern University Law
Center be merged with the Paul Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State
University.'°' While it. accepted the Master's general finding that
merger of the state's geographically proximate "black" and "white"
universities would be an inappropriate remedy, the court created a
special exception for legal education."° In the legal education context,
the court asserted, the separation of students by race had had a dra-
matically detrimental effect upon black students."' Moreover, the ad-
ministrative difficulties of effecting a merger could be easily over-
come. 12
The court emphasized the financial cost of maintaining a dual
system of higher education, and the benefits of a merger in eliminating
both the educational inefficiency and the economic burden of dupli-
cate programs existing virtually side by side."' Accordingly, the court
ordered the elimination of duplicate programs at the schools over a
five-year period and the gradual implementation of a more stringent
admissions standard at the newly merged school than was then in effect
at Southern. 14 In an effort to ensure that the merger did not dispro-
portionately burden black students seeking to enter law school, the
court further imposed a ten percent special admissions category on
the newly formed institution.""
In response to motions by the United States and by Southern
University, the court rejected the assertion that, even with a special
admissions quota, the merger would result in limiting access to legal
education in Louisiana to the disproportionate detriment of black
applicants. 16 It also rejected arguments about Southern University's
I" See id. at 724-25.
109 See 718 F. Stipp, 419, 507, 513-14 (E.D. La. 1989) (hereinafter Louisiana 1]; 718 F. Supp.
525, 532-34 (E.D, La. 1989) [hereinafter Louisiana 17].
Louisiana II, 718 F. Supp. at 533.
ttt Id. at 532. The court observed that. because virtually all of the state's black law students
attended the institution with the inferior resources, Louisiana was continuing to produce a
"secondary class of lawyers unable to compete fully in the professional context." Louisiana 1, 718
Supp. at 514.
112 Louisiana I, 718 F. Supp. at 513.
1 " See id.
114 M. at 514.
115 See id.
116 Louisiana II, 718 F. Supp. at 527, 533.
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historical mission in educating lawyers in the segregated south and the
institutional loyalty of its alumni when weighed against the efficiency
of providing equal access to consolidated research, teaching and place-
ment facilities.' 17
 The court asserted that the constitutional deprivation
of Louisiana blacks had been particularly great in legal education, and
invoked the mandate created by Swann that a "court's equitable power
to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies."""
C. Bazemore v. Friday and "This Wholly Different Milieu" 119
The activist view of the affirmative duty to dismantle segregated
systems of public higher education would by now have become firmly
established as law in the federal courts were it not for the precedential
status accorded in the debate to the 1986 United States Supreme Court
decision in Bazemore v. Friday.' 20 Bazemore involved the desegregation
of public higher education in the sense that the North Carolina Ex-
tension Service, which the plaintiffs had accused of a range of discrimi-
natory practices in employment and the provision of services, was a
division of the School of Agriculture and Life Sciences at North Caro-
lina State University. 12 ' In a concurring opinion that expressed the
judgment of the Court, Justice White addressed the specific allegation
that the Extension Service continued to operate racially separate 4-H
and Homemaker Clubs.' 22
 The Court held that although the Extension
Service had maintained segregated clubs prior to 1965, it was not
currently in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because it had
discontinued its prior discrimination and implemented entirely race-
neutral admissions policies.'" Justice White's opinion observed that
117
 Id. at 533-34.
118 Id. at 534 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
119
 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (White, J., concurring) (1986).
12° See Kenyon D. Bunch, Patrick Higginbotham's Third Road k Desegregating Higher Educa-
tion: Something Old or Something New?, I8 0010 N.U. L. REV. 11, 15
-17 (1901).
121
 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 389, 391.
122 Id. at 387, 407. Prior to August 1, 1965, the North Carolina Extension Service was divided
into two branches. id' at 390. Only the "Negro branch" had a racial designation and it was
composed entirely of black personnel and served only the black citizens of the state. Id. On
August 1, 1965, in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state merged the two branches
of the service. Id. at 390-91. The plaintiffs in the case, who included black employees of the
Service and parents of 4-H members, complained that vestiges of the former dual system re-
mained. Id. at 391. Among these was the continued existence of numerous all-white and all-black
Clubs. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 407-08.
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any racial imbalance remaining in any of the clubs was thus the result
of "wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private individuals."'
In the view of Justice White, because the clubs had adopted neu-
tral admissions policies, the fact that many of the clubs remained
racially segregated should not be attributable to any prior action of the
state, but rather to the unfettered choice of private individuals.'" By
this standard, there was no current violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'"
Having determined that the Extension Service was not currently
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice White went on to
distinguish Green v. County School Board.'" Even if the Extension Serv-
ice's voluntary choice program was not sufficient to shield it from
liability, in the Court's view, the holding in Green that such programs
did not adequately meet a public school system's affirmative duty to
integrate its student body did not apply here.'" The Court observed
that schoolchildren must go to school, but there is no compulsion to
join 4-H and Homemaker Clubs, and while school boards do have the
authority to create attendance zones and to assign students to specific
schools, the state has no statutory or regulatory power to dictate to
children which, if any, clubs they should join.'" Green, which was sound
law "in the context of the public schools" had no application to "this
wholly different milieu."'"
In sum, the lower court decisions that followed ASTA adhered to
the principle that a state's affirmative duty to dismantle its segregated
system of public higher education extended beyond the adoption of
race-neutral policies.' 31 The courts in Norris, Geier and United States v.
Louisiana looked to the affirmative duty in Green, and not to ASTA,
for guidance in desegregating public colleges and universities.'" But
the ASTA court's reasoning that the scope of' a state's duty to desegre-
gate its institutions of public higher education was a limited one re-
tained its vitality, owing in part to the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance of the trial court's decision.'" The support lent to ASTA's
freedom of choice argument by the Bazemore Court fortified its prece-
124 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring).
125 See id. at 407-08.
126 /4. at 408.
127 Id.
128 Id.
128 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
130 Id.
oi See Bunch, supra note 120, at 17.
192 See id. at. 21.
199 See SUpra note 86 and accompanying text.
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dential value.'" When the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Mississippi evaluated the state's efforts to desegregate
its prior de jure system in Ayers v. Allain, it faced alternative concep-
tions of a state's duty: one that held that race-neutral policies and
practices were sufficient; and another that mandated extensive reme-
dial measures to undo the vestiges of past discrimination.'"
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN MISSISSIPPI AND
AYERS V. ALI-AIN
A. History and Overview
In 1954, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown v.
Board of Education declaring an end to the principle of "separate but
equal," higher education in Mississippi was both separate and un-
equal.'" At that time, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of
Higher Learning ("the Board of Trustees") had plenary power over a
statewide system consisting of eight colleges and universities.'" The
University of Mississippi (founded in 1844), Mississippi State University
(1878), Mississippi University for Women (1884), University of South-
ern Mississippi (1910), and Delta State University (1924) were re-
stricted to white persons only by act of the state legislature; Alcorn
State University (1871), Jackson State University (1940) and Mississippi
Valley.State University (1946) were specifically designated by the legis-
lature to serve the state's black population.'"
The great watershed in the history of Mississippi's desegregated
system occurred on February 1, 1961, when James H. Meredith, a black
man, applied to the Registrar of the University of Mississippi for ad-
mission to the Spring 1961 session. 13° After denying Meredith's appli-
cation on the grounds of "overcrowded conditions," the Board of
Trustees adopted a variety of new admissions policies."° These in-
cluded the requirement that all students achieve a minimum score on
tests devised by the American College Testing Program (ACT) and the
reaffirmation of an alumni voucher requirement that required appli-
cants to submit at least five letters of recommendation as to strong
im See Ayers 1, 674 F. Stipp. 1523, 1553 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
135 See Bunch, supra note 120, at 12.
136 Ayers I, 674 F. Stipp. at 1528.
I 37 1d. al 1526.
I33 /d. at 1526-29. For a more complete description of the evolution of Mississippi's dual
system of higher education, see id. at 1526-28.
139 See id. at 1530.
"° Id. at 1530-31.
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moral character from alumni of the institution to which they were
applying."' In 1962, in the case of Meredith v. Fair, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an order striking down
the alumni voucher requirement as unconstitutional and calling for
the immediate admission of Meredith to the University of Mississippi. 142
The decade following the Meredith decision witnessed the pro-
tracted struggle to break down the Board of Trustees' discriminatory
policies in the areas of student admissions, faculty hiring, programs
and funding.'" In 1969, as these preliminary efforts were intensifying,
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW") sent a letter to the State of Mississippi and the Board of
Trustees urging them to submit within 120 days a cohesive desegrega-
tion plan that would dismantle the former de jure system.'`'" Five years
later, the Board of Trustees replied by submitting a plan of compliance
that expressed a basic objective of improving educational opportunities
for all citizens and outlining certain goals related to opposite-race
student admissions, the equalizing of funding and the upgrading of
facilities at the three historically black universities. 145 HEW's rejection
of the plan of compliance precipitated the lawsuit in Ayers v. Allain."6
B. Ayers v. Allain in the Federal District Court
Private plaintiffs commenced the class action in Ayers v. Allain on
January 28, 1975, alleging that the defendant State of Mississippi and
the Board of Trustees were maintaining a racially dual system of public
higher education. 147 On April 21, 1975, the United States intervened
141 Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1531.
142 See Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
143 See Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1529. Even token admissions in each of the five historically
white institutions were not achieved until five years after Meredith with the enrollment of a black
student at the University of Southern Mississippi in 1967, Id. The process of enrolling white
students in the historically black universities was even more protracted. See id. Similar evidence
emerged in Ayers I of the reticence of the universities to hire opposite-race faculty: Mississippi
Valley State University did not hire its first full-time white faculty member until 1968; Mississippi
State University did not hire a full-time black instructor until 1974. Id.
144 See id. at 1530.
145 1d.
116 1d.
147 Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1524. The plaintiffs alleged that the state was in violation of the
Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and
1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §200d, et seq. Id. On September 17,
1975, the plaintiff class was certified in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi and defined as: "All black citizens residing in Mississippi, whether students, former
students, parents, employees, or taxpayers, who have been, are, or will be discriminated against
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as a party plaintiff.'" The plaintiffs alleged that the State of Mississippi
had maintained its prior de jure segregated system of higher education
through policies and practices governing student admissions, and
through the imposition of institutional mission statements that per-
petuated disparities between historically black and historically white
institutions.'" The plaintiffs emphasized in their contrast the number
and quality of academic programs, the quality of instructional staff,
allocation of land grant functions, quality of physical plant and the
distribution of financial resources.'" The defendants contended that
the mere continued existence of universities with predominantly white
and predominantly black student bodies was not by itself a violation of
the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.'m On the contrary, the state
argued that it was currently implementing good faith race-neutral
admissions procedures and operating a fully integrated, unitary system
of higher education, which was at that time "wholly untainted by
discriminatory actions or purposes." 52
For twelve years after the filing, the court supervised attempts by
the parties to achieve a consensual resolution of their differences
through the voluntary dismantling by the state of its prior segregated
system.'" This process included the assignment by the Board of "Mis-
sion Statements" to each of the institutions, so that unnecessary pro-
gram duplication could be eliminated and resources could be allocated
more efficiently.'" When, after eleven years of negotiations, over
ninety-nine percent of the white students continued to be enrolled in
on account of race in receiving equal educational opportunity and/or equal employment oppor-
tunity in the universities operated by [the] Board of Trustees." Id. at 1526.
148 Id. at 1524. The United States intervened pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, §§ 601
and 602 of Title VI and § 902 of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
' 49 1d. at 1525.
151 Ayers 1, 674 F. Stipp. at 1525.
' 52 1d. at 1525-26.
1 " United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727,2733 (1992).
154 See id. at 2741-42. These "missions" were clustered in three categories: comprehensive,
urban and regional. Id. at 2742. "Comprehensive" universities were those with the greatest
resources and program offerings, and the Board authorized them to continue their leadership
in research and the granting of graduate and professional degrees. Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1539.
The three institutions designated as "comprehensive," University of Mississippi, Mississippi State
and Southern Mississippi, were all exclusively white under the prior de jure segregated system.
Id. at 1526-28. Jackson State, previously all-black, was the only "urban" university, and it was
assigned a more limited research and degree-granting function. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2742. Finally,
the Board used the designation "regional" to encompass the remaining institutions that would
focus upon undergraduate education. Id. In the previously segregated system, two—Delta State
and Mississippi University for Women—had been exclusively white, and two—Alcorn State and
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historically white institutions, and seventy-one percent of the black
students were enrolled in the historically black institutions, the parties
proceeded to trial in the United Suites District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi.'"
The plaintiffs argued that because the effects of prior state action
persisted, Mississippi remained under a continuing obligation to elimi-
nate the vestiges of racial dualism, "root and branch." 156 The court held,
however, that Mississippi was not currently in violation of the Consti-
tution or the statutes of the United States because it had fully met its
affirmative duty by adopting race-neutral admissions policies and good
faith procedures in the administration of its higher education system.'"
The court thus accepted the state's contention that its educational
policies and procedures were untainted by any discriminatory pur-
pose.' 58
This holding rested on the distinction made in ASTA between a
state's duty in the area of elementary and secondary education, and
its more limited obligation in the higher education context.'" It was
buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Bazemore, which held
that in the context of extension service clubs, where participation was
voluntary, the state fulfilled its obligation to "disestablish segregation"
simply by adopting a policy allowing all young people to choose freely
which club to join.'" By emphasizing freedom of choice as the factor
that made universities more like 4-H and Homemaker Clubs than like
elementary and secondary schools, the Ayers I court was able to side
with the ASTA court in holding that good faith implementation of
nondiscriminatory policies satisfied the state's affirmative duty to de-
segregate a higher education system." The focus upon freedom of
choice also enabled the court to view its decision as essentially harmo-
nious with the decision in Green. 162 The Ayers I court viewed Green as
standing for the limited proposition that where "choice" was tradition-
ally controlled by the state, in elementary and secondary education,
then the state was required to assert its power to maximize the racial
Mississippi Valley State—had been exclusively black. Id. at 2742. The Supreme Court would devote
close attention to the effects of these "Mission Statements." See id at 2741-42.
155 See Ayers II, 893 F.2d at 735.
156Aym, 1
, 674 F. Supp. at 1525.
157 id. at 1564.
15A Id.
159 Id. at 1552-53 (citing ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 788-90).
"id. at 1553 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408).
161 See Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
11'2 1d. at 1553.
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integration of the component schools.'" 3 But where individuals have
traditionally been free to choose whether and where to attend school,
as in the higher education context, it would be inappropriate to evalu-
ate a state's compliance with its duty simply by measuring the relative
degree of integration that had actually been achieved."
Judge Biggers, who issued the opinion of the lower court, ad-
vanced two additional lines of analysis.'" He remarked that the dispo-
sition of the Ayers lawsuit was anomalous because it did not depend
upon retrospective analysis, the adjudication of facts existing prior to the
filing of the complaint."Rather, it required an evaluation of the state's
policies and procedures as they existed in the present—some twelve
years after Jake Ayers had actually initiated the suit.' 67 In each of the
areas of educational policy under inquiry, the court recognized that
the state had once maintained thoroughgoing segregative policies.'" 8
Nevertheless, the opinion held that Mississippi was not currently in
violation of its constitutional or statutory duties because of its good
faith policies."
Finally, Judge Biggers asserted that the Ayers lawsuit was not about
the "efficiency or the economic wisdom of higher education policies"
but rather about the charge of racial discrimination in higher educa-
tion."° Despite this assertion, the opinion did remark upon the eco-
nomic inefficiency of segregation, particularly in an impoverished
state.' 71 It concluded by linking the issues of economy and efficiency
with the historic facts of segregation when it asserted that the State of
Mississippi had, because of its policy of racial separation, undertaken
to fund more institutions of higher learning than were justified by the
resources available. 172
69 Id.
104 1d. at 1554.
165 See id. at 1551, 1554.
1 °13 4yers 1, 679 F. Supp. at 1551.
167 1d.
1 °8 See id. at 1554-63. The opinion adopted this procedure in its analysis of the following
areas of inquiry: the use of ACT scores in student admissions, id. at 1554-57; the recruitment of
other-race students at individual institutions, id. at 1557-58; the Mission Statements assigned to
each institution by the Board of Trustees in 1981, id. at 1558-61; unnecessary program duplica-
tion, id. at 1561; facilities and financing, id. at 1561-62; land grant activities, id. at 1562-63; faculty
and staff employment, id. at 1563.
11° See id. at 1557, 1558, 1561, 1563.
170 Id. at 1541.
171 See Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1560, 1563, 1564.
172
 Id. at 1564.
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C. Ayers v. Allain in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
Upon appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Ayers lawsuit generated two
opinions: one authored by Judge Goldberg for a three-judge panel
which reversed the district court's decision ("Ayers II" ); 178 and the other
by Judge Duhe for the court rehearing the appeal en banc, which
reinstated the judgment of the district court ("Ayers III" ). 17 M1 Both opin-
ions recurred to the exhaustive fact-finding of the district court and
reproduced portions of the recorded data. 17'" But the Ayers III majority
recognized that the plaintiffs did not argue upon appeal, as is usually
the case, that the findings were clearly erroneous."' Rather, the plain-
tiffs' allegations of error rested upon the contention that the district
court had applied the incorrect remedial duty.'" They argued that the
district court had focused, improperly, upon the race-neutrality of the
state's higher education policies, rather than viewing them in light of
an affirmative remedial obligation to undo the harms of past discrimi-
nation. 178
The opinions of the three-judge panel and the en banc majority
as to the correct remedial duty diverged upon the nature of Green's
affirmative duty and its applicability to the higher education context. 17°
For the panel majority in Ayers II, the application of Green to the public
university context demanded the achievement of a unitary system by
removing "all vestiges of de jure segregation root and branch."'m The
opinion found the vestiges of past discrimination in the areas of stu-
dent admissions requirements, the racial composition of faculty and
administration at the historically white institutions, disparities in aca-
demic programs, funding practices and mission designations. 18 ' For
this reason, the panel majority held that the defendants had not
satisfied their affirmative duty under Green.' 82
On the other hand, the en banc majority affirmed the district
court's reliance upon ASTA and Bazemore, and held that Mississippi
173
	 Ayers II, 893 F.2d 732, 756 (panel) (5th Cir. 1990).
174 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d 676, 692 (en bane) (5th Cir. 1990).
175 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 678-82; Ayers 11, 893 F.2d at 733-42.
176 Ayers III, 014 F2d at 688.
"7 Id.
178 Id, at 691.
179 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 682-87; Ayers II, 803 F.2d at 750-51.
180 Ayers II, 893 F.2d at 752.
181 Id. at 752-53.
1
'2 /d. at 753.
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had satisfied its constitutional obligation to disestablish its previously
segregated higher education system by discontinuing prior discrimina-
tory practices and adopting race-neutral policies in good faith.m The
opinion placed particular emphasis upon the element of freedom of
choice which made a "wholly different milieu" of the higher education
context, and distinguished the scope of the affirmative duty from that
required in elementary and secondary schools. 184 It also determined
that the freedom of choice that race-neutral policies in Mississippi had
created was not inconsistent with Green, because Green did not invali-
date all freedom of choice plans. 185 Rather, freedom of choice might
prove itself in operation, particularly where no alternative methods
were available.' 86 Because the full range of remedial options available
at lower education levels, such as pupil assignment, busing, zoning and
attendance quotas, were not available in the university context, the
court reasoned that a freedom of choice plan provided the best alter-
native for fulfilling the Green mandate.' 87
The Ayers III majority rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
Board of Trustees' admissions standards and mission designations were
infected with a discriminatory intention and thus perpetuated the
prior de jure segregated system.' 88 It did acknowledge, however, that
in the areas of faculty hiring, and disparities in programs and facilities,
the inequalities between the historically black and historically white
institutions were "reminiscent" of the prior segregated system. 189 Nev-
ertheless, the defendants' current policies were not racially motivated
and, in the opinion of the majority, there were no current constitu-
tional violations. 190
On appeal, the plaintiffs had advanced three different remedies
of their own: the merger of branch centers of historically white insti-
tutions with nearby historically black institutions; the elimination of
certain duplicate programs, so that they would only be offered at the
183 Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 687.
184 /d. at 685 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408).
188
 Id. at 685.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 686-87.
158 See Ayers 111, 914 F.2d at 688-91. The court asserted that it was not required to pass on
the financial wisdom or the educational efficiency of the mission designations, only on whether
they denied plaintiffs their equal protection rights. Id. at 690. Similarly, the court insisted that its
only concern was whether the admissions policies, in particular the use of ACT scores without
high school grades, was discriminatory, not whether such a policy might be "narrow, inaccurate,
and educationally unsound." Id. at 690-91.
IN° Id. at 692.
1901d.
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historically black institutions; and the enhancement of programs at the
historically black schools to create equal educational opportunities at
those institutions."" The Ayers III court rejected the first two on the
grounds that, in the Fifth Circuit where courts had taken great pains
to open the doors to educational opportunity, these remedies actually
reduced student choice by eliminating programs.' 92 The court argued
that all students would be done a disservice by remedies that sought
to maximize integration by minimizing diversity of opportunities and
vitiating choice." In rejecting the plaintiffs' request to mandate a
remedy calling for the enhancement of programs at historically black
universities, the court cited the limitations created by financial condi-
tions in Mississippi.'" More than this, the court insisted that it could
not adjust the inequities under principles of equal protection without
reattaching legal significance to the designations "Black School" and
'White School."' 95 By declaring with the force of law that funding,
offerings and facilities at the black schools should at all times remain
equal, the court would in effect be signalling a return to the "revolting
principle" of separate but equal, whose source it declined to cite. 19"
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham argued
that by focusing on the absence of any current discriminatory purpose,
the Ayers III court was denying the importance of perpetuation.'97 Once
the court had found the "deep traces" of prior segregation in the
present higher education system, the dissent maintained that it was
required to find the state in violation of its duty to undo the wrong:
"This case is about remedy—detecting present effects of the earlier
wrong and defining the remedial response."'" In determining the
nature of that response, Judge Higginbotham rejected the application
of Green to the higher education context.' 99 The dissenting opinion
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment itself supported no substan-
tive right to a particular racial mix and it rejected Green if it demanded
absolute racial balancing as the goal of remedial action in education. 20"
Although Judge Higginbotham advanced no remedies of his own, he
urged that the state could fulfill its constitutional duty to eliminate the
191
 Id. at 687.
192 id.
193 Id.
191 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 690.
195 Id. at 692.
196 Id.
197 See id. at 694 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Ayers III, 914 E2d at 694 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
200 Id.
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vestiges of segregation without requiring absolute racial balancing, by
striving instead for real choice and educational opportunities that were
"truly equal."20 '
IV. UNITED STATES V. FORDICE: THE AYERS DECISION IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. The Proper Legal Standard
In its decision in United States v. Fordice, the United States Su-
preme Court enunciated for the first time in the nearly four decades
since Brown the proper legal standard for evaluating whether a state
has met its obligation to dismantle a prior de jure segregated system
of higher education.2°2
 The Court held that Mississippi's current race-
neutral policies had failed to meet the affirmative duty after applying
the following test to the state's conduct:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its
prior system that continue to have segregative effects—
whether by influencing student enrollment decisions or by
fostering segregation in other facets of the university system—
and such policies are without sound educational justification
and can be practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied
its burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior system. 2°3
In so holding, the Supreme Court shifted the burden from the
aggrieved plaintiffs onto the State of Mississippi either to justify any
constitutionally suspect remnants of its prior segregated system or
to eliminate them. 204
 The Court thus vacated the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit and remanded the Ayers case to the District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi for proceedings to consider
appropriate remedial action. 205
Speaking for an 8-1 majority, Justice White attributed the lower
courts' error in ruling that Mississippi had brought itself into compli-
ance with the Equal Protection Clause to its improper reliance upon
the decisions in ASTA and Bazemare. 206
 Justice White noted that the
district court derived from ASTA a test that emphasized "current"
201 Id.
202 See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. CL 2727, 2732 (1992).
202 Id. at 2737.
204 Id. at 2738, 2741.
205 Id. at 2743.
2115 See id. at 2734-37.
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race-neutral policies and procedures as the gauge of a state's compli-
ance.207 Its inquiry instead should have been whether policies traceable
to the de jure system were still in force and continued to have discrimi-
natory effects." According to the Court, if the perpetuation of these
effects was directly attributable to state action, then the state remained
in violation of the Constitution." On those grounds, the lower court's
use of Bazemore to buttress its reasoning was inappropriate, because in
that case the Court determined that the existing racial imbalance in
the membership of the 4-H and Homemaker's Clubs was the result of
the free choice of the individuals rather than any coercive action on
the part of the state. 21 °
B. Application of the Proper Legal Standard
Justice White argued that if the lower courts had applied the
correct legal standard to the factual findings of the district court, they
would have determined that several constitutionally suspect elements
survived from Mississippi's prior segregated system. 2 " Even though the
state's policies appeared to be neutral on their face, they had the effect
of substantially restricting students' choices in admissions, even as they
perpetuated the racial identifiability of the eight institutions in the
public university system. 212
 The Court proceeded to uncover the traces
of segregation in its analysis of four areas: admissions standards; dupli-
cation of programs; mission statements; and the existence of eight
higher education institutions. 213
 In identifying four principal "rem-
nants" of the prior de jure system that Mississippi was required to justify
or eliminate, the opinion warned that the Court was making no effort
to identify all the aspects of the higher education system that the
district court would be required to review on remand. 2 ' 4
In 1963, in the aftermath of Meredith v. Fair and the enrollment
of the first black student at the University of Mississippi, the Board of
Trustees implemented a requirement that all students admitted to the
three larger historically white universities earn a minimum score of
fifteen on the ACT tests. 215 The district court had found a clear "dis-
207
 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2735.
208
 Id. at 2736.
209 Id. at 2735.
210 See id. at 2737.
211 /d. at 2738.
212 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2738.
213 See id. at 2738-43.
214 /d. at 2738.
2151d.
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criminatory taint" to this requirement, given that the average ACT
score for white students at that time was eighteen and the average score
for blacks was seven. 216
 Despite this finding, the district court con-
cluded, and the en banc court of appeals agreed, that the continued
use made of ACT scores actually derived from policies enacted in the
1970s as a response to the problem of student unpreparedness. 217 The
Supreme Court, however, reasoned that this mid-passage justification
for policies originally enacted to discriminate against black students
did not make the current use of the ACT tests any less constitutionally
suspect.218
 The Court was struck by the fact that schools such as MUW
and Mississippi Valley State, with ostensibly the same "regional" mission
to provide quality undergraduate education, had widely varying admis-
sions standards. 219
 The majority found that such disparate admissions
standards were not only traceable to the previously segregated system
and had originally been adopted for a discriminatory purpose, but that
they continued to have discriminatory effects by restricting students'
choices of schools in ways that perpetuate segregation.22°
The Court was particularly critical of the state's failure to consider
an applicant's high school grades in addition to ACT scores, especially
because the American College Testing Program itself discouraged the
use of test scores alone as a predictor of college success. 22 ' The lower
courts had accepted the Board of Trustees' good faith explanation that
the use of ACT scores as the sole admissions criterion stemmed from
a concern for grade inflation and a lack of comparability between the
grading standards among the state's high schools, 222 But the Supreme
Court found that this rationale could not withstand the application of
216 Id.
217 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d, 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Ayers 1, 674 F. Stipp. at 1531.
In 1992, all Mississippi residents were required to score at least 15 for automatic admission to
any of the historically white institutions, except Mississippi University for Women which required
an 18. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2739. By contrast, a score of 13 qualified a student for automatic
admission to the three historically black universities. Id. Because 72% of white high school
students in Mississippi achieve a score of at least 15, while only 30% of black students attained
that standard, the Court found it unsurprising that Mississippi's universities remained predomi-
nantly identifiable by race. Id.
218 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2738.
515 Id. at 2739.
220
221 Id. at 2740. The ACTP has been particularly sensitive to the disparity between the test
scores achieved by black and white students, and to the perception that standardized tests such
as the ACT may be racially biased. Id. For this reason, the ACTP has suggested that a combination
of test scores and high school grades provides a better predictor of a student's ability to do
college-level work. Id. The vast majority of states that require the ACT test had adopted the.
Program's recommendation. See id.
222 Id.
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the correct legal standard; because the "ACT-only" admission standard
had clear segregative effects, Mississippi would be required on remand
to demonstrate that it could not be eliminated without "eroding sound
educational policy."223
The district court classified a duplication of academic programs
as "unnecessary" any time two or more universities offered the same
nonessential or noncore program.'" Based on this definition, the trial
court found that 34.6 percent of the undergraduate programs and 90
percent of the graduate programs at historically black universities were
"unnecessarily duplicated" at the historically white institutions.225 When
the Supreme Court applied the correct legal standard, it found that
the duplication of programs was integral to the prior segregated system
because the very notion of "separate but equal" required duplicative
programs in black and white schools, and that the present duplication
of programs help to perpetuate that system. 223
 Because the trial court
had observed that the duplication could not be justified "economically
or in terms of providing quality education," the Supreme Court urged
that the state be required on remand to provide educational justifica-
tion for such duplication or to eliminate as many programs as would
be practicable.227
In 1981, the Board of Trustees assigned mission designations to
Mississippi's eight institutions of public higher education. 228
 These
designations tended to reinforce the more limited academic functions
that had been assigned to the exclusively black universities during the
prior de jure segregated system, in that only three historically white
institutions received the "comprehensive" designation reserved for
schools that were to receive the highest level of funding to support the
most diversified programs. 229 The court of appeals differed from the
district court in its recognition that "inequalities among the institutions
largely followfedi the mission designations, and the mission designa-
tions to some degree follow [ed] the historical racial assignments."2"
Because the Supreme Court found that the current mission statements
interfered with student choice and tended to perpetuate aspects of the
223 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2740.
224 Id. (quoting Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1540). The Supreme Court observed that this
expansive definition would include all duplication of nonbasic liberal arts and science courses at
the bachelor's level and all duplication of graduate and professional programs. See id.
225 Id. at 2740-41 (citing Ayers I, 674 F. Stipp. at 1541).
226 1d. at 2741.
227 id. (citing Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp, at 1541).
228 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
219 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2741-42. See also supra note 154 and accompanying text.
23° Id. at 2742 (quoting Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 692).
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prior de jure system, it instructed the district court on remand to apply
the standard of sound educational practice to determine whether the
discriminatory effects of the mission assignments could be elimi-
nated."'
The Supreme Court emphasized that Mississippi would never have
founded as many as eight public institutions of higher education were
it not for state laws mandating the separation of the races.232 It cited
the district court's finding that Mississippi currently undertook to fund
more universities than were justified by the financial conditions in the
state and that such a practice was both "wasteful and irrational."233
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that a larger number of
institutions enhances the number of options for students, it issued the
following mandate to the district court: to determine on remand 1)
whether the maintenance of all eight universities affected student
choices and perpetuated a segregated system of higher education; 2)
whether the retention of each of these institutions could be education-
ally justified; and 3) whether one or more of the state's public univer-
sities could be practicably closed or merged with other existing insti-
tutions. 234
The majority opinion concluded by instructing the district court
upon remand to address several additional concerns about funding." 5
Like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court rejected what it per-
ceived to be a request by the private petitioners to order increased
funding to upgrade the three historically black institutions. 2st' It echoed
the reasoning of the lower court that the affirmative duty to dismantle
a prior de jure system has not been met when a state perpetuates
"separate" institutions, even if they are "more equal." 237 Nevertheless,
the majority's opinion concluded by leaving the district court the
option to consider whether enhanced funding of the historically black
institutions might be necessary to eradicate the effects of prior segre-
gatio11. 238
231 Id. at 2742.
"2 Id.
233
	 (citing Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1563-64).
2mFordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743. In a footnote, Justice White rejected as inappropriate in the
higher education context the "radical" remedies, such as reassignment of students, adopted in
Green. Id. at 2736 n.9. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that this rejection of mandatory
student assignment had effectively deprived district court judges of the most efficient desegrega-
tion remedy. Id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 M
236 Id. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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C. Justice Thomas, Concurring; Justice Scalia, Dissenting
Both Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion and Justice Scalia
in his dissent expressed reservations about the effects which the major-
ity's opinion would have, not only upon the district court's efforts to
generate appropriate remedies in Mississippi's higher education sys-
tem, but upon the sixteen other states where the vestiges of prior de
jure systems might also be found. 239 Justice Thomas wrote separately to
urge that the standard that the Court had applied to the higher
education context in Mississippi was not the same standard that the
Green Court had adopted in the elementary and secondary schools
because it did not compel the elimination of any detected racial im-
balance in the schools. 24° In explicitly rejecting the "radical" remedies
such as student reassignment which had prevailed in the Green Court's
mandate, the Court had, in Thomas's view, instructed the district court
to focus upon the eradication of discriminatory policies rather than the
imbalance directly. 24'
Justice Thomas insisted that the Supreme Court's decision por-
tended "neither the destruction of historically black colleges nor the
severing of those institutions from their distinctive histories and tradi-
tions."292 With the majority's emphasis upon "sound educational prac-
tices," "sound educational justification," and "sound educational pol-
icy," Justice Thomas urged the district court to recognize that sound
educational justification did exist for the continued vitality of the
historically black colleges.'" While Justice Thomas, like the majority,
rejected the remedy of creating special enclaves for one particular
racial group, he did envision a constitutionally approvable system of
higher education that operated a diverse array of schools, including
historically black institutions, open to all students on a race-neutral
basis, but with traditions and programs that might appeal to one race
more than another.'"
Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia perceived that the majority
opinion had in fact adopted the Green affirmative duty and with it a
2" See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2744-46 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2746-53 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate
concurrence to emphasize the heavy burden placed upon Mississippi, especially in light of its
long history of discrimination, to justify any remnant of its de jure segregated system or to
eliminate it. See id. at 2743-44.
24" Id. at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring).
241 Id. at 2745.
"2 /d. at 2749.
243 Id. at 2745-46.
2" Fordire, 112 S. Ct. at 2746.
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requirement of compelled racial balancing. 245
 Moreover, according to
Justice Scalia, the lower courts had been correct in their reliance upon
the freedom of choice argument of Bazemore and upon the standard
for dismantling a dual system which that decision had generated:
discontinuation of discriminatory policies and the adoption of race-
neutral admissions."6 Justice Scalia not only regretted the majority's
failure to accord precedential value to the Court's own reasoning in
Bazemore, a case that he found parallel in all relevant respects, he
observed that the majority's standard was actually two different tests
without significant guidance to lower courts as to how they should be
applied."' He referred to the addition to the announced standard that
the state would be required to justify or eliminate any policy that
"substantially restricted] a person's choice of which institution to
enter."'" In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia found no guidance.for
the lower courts as to the way restriction of choice was to be measured,
and he observed that if the state adopted the Court's recommendation
to eliminate programs or to close schools, the remedy itself would have
the effect of restricting choice. 249 Finally, Justice Scalia predicted that
years of litigation, confusion and destabilization would result in every
formerly de jure state that would be required to apply the Court's
standard in Fardice. 25°
At the conclusion of his dissent, Justice Scalia echoed Justice
Thomas in a concern for the effect that the majority's ruling might
have on the historically black universities. 25 ' justice Scalia observed that
the citizens of a state might conclude that it was desirable to fund
institutions used predominantly by blacks on an equal basis with insti-
tutions used predominantly by whites, even though the Constitution
did not require such equal funding. 252 And yet, to concede a "sound
educational justification" to fostering schools in which blacks receive
their education in a "majority" setting would contradict what Justice
Scalia saw as the compulsory-integration philosophy underlying
245 1d. at 2751, 2753 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
Justice Scalia agreed that the Constitution compelled Mississippi
ers in its public universities. Id. at 2746. He also agreed with the
calling for a further review of Mississippi's use of ACT scores in
246 Id. at 2750.
247 Id. at 2747, 2750.
248 Id. at 2747 (quoting the majority, id. at 2738. See also id.
249 Fordire, 112 S. Ct. at 2747.
250 Id. at 2753.
251 See id. at 2751-52.
252 Id. at 2752.
in part and dissenting in part).
to remove discriminatory barri-
portion of the majority opinion
its admissions process. See id.
at 2739, 2741, 2742-43).
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Green. 255 The standard adopted by the Court could only have the effect
of eliminating the historically black universities, a result that, according
to the dissent, was not required by the Constitution, and which flew in
the face of statutorily expressed policies to enhance those very institu-
tions."' Justice Scalia specifically referred to the passage of an act by
Congress, entitled "Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Uni-
versities," which authorized increased government subsidies to histori-
cally black colleges as a remedy for the effects of discrimination by state
and federal governments against these institutions. 255
D. The Ayers Decision on Remand to Judge Biggers
On September 24, 1992, Judge Neal B. Biggers, Jr., United States
District Judge for the Northern District of Mississippi issued an order
setting a status and scheduling conference for October 22, 1992. 256 The
parties were ordered to be prepared at that time to propose remedies
to resolve the state's liability pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinion
in United States v. Fordice in the following areas: 1) whether the state
should continue to maintain eight universities; 2) whether admissions
policies should be revised; 3) whether the state should continue dupli-
cative programs at some of its universities; 4) funding and staff for the
state universities. 257 At the hearing, the Board of Trustees issued a
one-hundred-page published report on "proposed remedies."258 While
the proposal devoted several paragraphs to a revision of admissions
standards and reduced program duplication, its thrust was the reor-
ganization of the state system into four institutions with a shared
mission.259 This system would result in the closure of one historically
253 Id.
254
 Fordice, 112 S, Ct, at 2752-53.
255 See al	 §§ 1060-1063c (1988). The statute states in pertinent part: "[T]he current
state of Black colleges and universities is partly attributable to the discriminatory action of the
States and the Federal Government and this discriminatory action requires the remedy of
enhancement of Black postsecondary institutions to ensure their continuation and participation
in fulfilling the Federal mission of equality of educational opportunity...." Id. at § 1060(3). The
federal regulations devised to implement the statute recognize the three historically black public
institutions in Mississippi as eligible recipients of federal enhancement funds. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 608.2(b) (1991).
256 See Order Setting Status and Scheduling Conference (Sept. 24, 1992), in 1 AYERS DECI-
SION, supra note 21.
257 Id.
258 See Defendant Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning's Proposed
Remedies (October 22, 1992), in 1 AYERS DECISION, supra note 21,
259 Id
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black institution, Mississippi Valley State University, and the merger of
another, Alcorn State, with Mississippi State University. 2" At the hear-
ing, Nathaniel Douglas, an attorney representing the Department of
Justice, contended that the presentation of formal proposals was pre-
mature, because substantial disagreement remained among the parties
about the actual problems any remedy would address."' Attorneys for
the plaintiffs did, however, respond to the Supreme Court's recom-
mendation on the closing of institutions by saying that "the very last
thing we want to see happen is that schools be closed." 262 If the goal
of the Ayers lawsuit had been to increase access for minority students,
plaintiffs' attorneys wondered how this could be achieved by "closing
schools that are now meeting the needs of educating minority stu-
dents. "263
V. JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION—AN ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court remanded the Ayers decision to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, it
enunciated for the first time the heavy burden that states bear to
eliminate the vestiges of their prior dual systems of public higher
education. 264 But the disagreement between justices Thomas and Scalia
in their opinions about the role of Green as the source for the majority's
standard, and about what remedial action that affirmative duty re-
quires suggests that the process of definition is far from complete. The
opinion in Fordice does strongly reinforce the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that the moral imperative of Brown v. Board of Education will
apply with equal vigor at all levels of public education. But like both
26() See id. The proposal also calls for the merger of Mississippi University for Women with
the University of Southern Mississippi. Id. The story of the opposition to the current proposal
on the part of supporters of the historically single-sex institution parallels the opposition of
supporters of the historically black institutions and has resulted in an unusual alliance of forces.
Id. See also Joyce Mercer, Plan to Desegregate Higher Education in Mississippi Unites State's Colleges,
Black and White Alike, CHRON. OF HIGHER Enuc., Nov, 4,1992, at A23-24.
261 See Transcript of Proceedings Before the judge Neal B. Biggers, jr., United States District
Judge, 13-16 (Oct. 22, 1992), in 2 AYERS DECISION, supra note 21.
262 Id. at 21.
263 Id. William F. Goodman, Jr., attorney for the Board of Trustees, pointed out that the state
had never requested permission to dose any institutions of higher learning; rather the Supreme
Court had commanded the state to consider that option. Id. at 23. Goodman also pointed out
that the Supreme Court had not required the state to spend any additional funds for the
enhancement of programs at the historically black institutions. Id. at 23-24. Finally, he accused
the plaintiffs of "running from the decision they obtained." Id. at 24.
2€ Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
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Brown decisions, Fordice has left the states uncertain about the precise
goals they must achieve, and the district courts largely without guid-
ance as to the actions they may mandate,
A. "Root and Branch": What Remedies Does Green Mandate/Allow?
Although the Brown decisions continue to exert their strong sym-
bolic authority in the debate over the desegregation of public higher
education, the courts' search for substantive guidance in the mandat-
ing of remedies has always begun with Green v. County School Board of
New Kent. In Green, justice Brennan expressed the formative standard
that the courts would apply by charging states with the "affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 265
The phrase "whatever steps might be necessary" established the broad
discretion of the courts to exercise their equitable powers. The meta-
phor of "root and branch" suggested that courts would address them-
selves not only to the current visible manifestations of segregation but
to the sources of those effects in a state's prior de jure system. 266 It is
less clear, however, whether the transition to a "unitary" system could
be effected only by a process of "compelled integration" and the
achievement of absolute racial balancing, or whether racial discrimina-
tion could be eliminated through alternative remedies.
In the specific context of the prior de jure dual system in New
Kent County, Virginia, the Green court found that rezoning was a
relatively simple administrative remedy that would eliminate racial
discrimination through a process of integration. Although the opinion
did not name any other remedies that might have been suitable, it
acknowledged that there was no universal solution to the complex
problems involved in dismantling a de jure dual system. 267 Accordingly,
it urged a contextual approach in which courts should be encouraged
to weigh differing alternatives against the particular circumstances
presented by each case. 26h
B. Swann and Milliken: Two Remedial Approaches
The remedies approved by the Supreme Court in Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and in Milliken v. Bradley demon-
265 Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
266 Id.
2( ' 7 id. at 439,
268 See Id.
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strated the varied and divergent approaches that school boards might
take at the elementary and secondary school level to meet the affirma-
tive duty mandated by Green. In Swann, the courts compelled the
integration of each institution within the school district. 269
 The reme-
dies that the courts approved, the establishing of required mathemati-
cal ratios, the implementation of a rezoning plan that would assign
students according to the fixed ratios, and the imposition of a burden
on the school district to justify the continuing racial identifiability of
any school in the district, are more sweeping than those applied in
Green.") But they reflect a similar understanding that a "unitary" sys-
tem is a racially balanced system, one in which there are no white
schools and no black schools, "but just schools." 27 t Significantly, the
Court also specified judicial authority to make recommendations con-
cerning the closing of existing schools, establishing that one effective
means of compelling integrated schooling would be to eliminate sin-
gle-race options."72
On the other hand, the Court in Milliken II focused less on the
requirement of a "unitary system" and more on the mandate to elimi-
nate racial discrimination "root and branch." It had been constrained
in its remedial authority by the holding in Milliken I that had invali-
dated an ambitious program of rezoning and student assignment,
because it involved an incorporation of school districts surrounding
the city of Detroit where no constitutional violations had been found.
The Milliken II court's alternative approach was to approve thirteen
new remedial and compensatory programs, and the enhancement of
educational opportunities "to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
such conduct."'"
While Swann and Milliken undoubtedly spurred district courts to
broader and more creative exercise of their equitable powers, the
decisions taken together offer a contradictory view of the precise
results required by desegregation remedies. The result-oriented view
of the pupil assignment remedy in Swann, with its use of mathematical
ratios, suggests that any desegregation plan may be open to attack if it
269 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 23. Although the district court ordered that "efforts should be
made to reach a 71-29 ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending
that one school is racially different front the others," it acknowledged that variations "from that
norm may be unavoidable." Id.
270 See id. at 22-31.
27[ Green, 391 U.S. at 442.
272 Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21.
273 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746).
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fails to achieve racial balancing and the elimination of racially "iden-
tifiable" schools. On the other hand, in eschewing a sweeping pupil
assignment remedy and focusing on quality education and reform
within schools that remain largely segregated, Milliken held out the
prospect that the enhancement of "separate" educational institutions
may meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, if that
remedy has the effect of restoring the victims of discriminatory con-
duct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct,
C. An Analysis of Judicial Remedies in Higher Education
Swann and Milliken take different paths to the fulfillment of the
mandate to eliminate racial discrimination in education. But either
option will produce ambiguous results in the higher education context.
The focus upon educational enhancement in Milliken challenges edu-
cators and the courts to make creative reforms in what institutions of
higher education teach and the way they teach it. Moreover, educa-
tional reform is costly and requires financially hard-pressed states to
make a crucial redefinition of fiscal priorities. On the other hand, the
focus on racial balancing is economically efficient in that it offers states
the prospect that they may achieve constitutional compliance in their
education systems by cutting programs and limiting racially identifiable
options. But, as Justice Scalia's dissent in Fordice observed, these steps
impinge upon the crucial role choice plays in students' decisions about
the kinds of education they will pursue. The choice between these two
positions is of immense significance in cases involving the desegrega-
tion of public higher education, and it is crucial to the fate of the
historically black institutions in the remedy mandated by the Court in
United States v, Fordice. 274
The Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions in the dec-
ades following Brown neither expressly included institutions of higher
education nor exempted them; they spoke simply of public educa-
tion."5
 But the Court seemed reticent to extend its remedy-making
power beyond the primary and secondary schools where local school
boards were already invested with power to create school attendance
zones and designate which schools students might attend. 276 This re-
274
 See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
276 See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 436 ("a unitary, nonracial system of public education"); Brawn
I, 347 U.S. at 495 ("in the field of public education").
276 See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (White, J., concurring) (1986). This professed
reluttance to extend the specific remedies of the Green, Swann and Milliken line of cases to the
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luctance to pronounce upon the application of Brown principles to
higher education was further striking because the very cases that the
Brown court cited as the foundation for its landmark ruling all involved
segregation in higher education. 277
 As a result, federal district and
circuit courts were left to adjudicate complaints of segregation in
higher education with no genuine guidance from the Supreme Court
and often with conflicting results.
I. The Scope of the Remedial Power in Higher Education
Initially, in the higher education context, the debate over alterna-
tives concerned not a choice among available remedies, but a conflict
over the scope of the duty itself. While the court in ASIA acknowledged
that the affirmative duty to dismantle a dual system of education
extended to colleges and universities, the scope of the duty in the
higher education context was not so great.278 The court arrived at this
conclusion at least in part because it interpreted the affirmative duty
in Green to mandate compelled integration and racial balancing in a
statewide system of higher education. In elementary and secondary
school districts where education was compulsory and local school
boards traditionally created attendance zones and assigned students,
racial balancing was an administratively feasible goal. 279 The court
could competently assist in achieving this result by reviewing decisions
about school construction or expansion.'" But the court decided that
it could not make a similar determination about the segregative effects
that the proposed construction of the branch campus of Auburn
University would have on Alabama's system of higher education. The
distinguishing features of higher education were its voluntary nature
and the freedom of students to choose from among a range of diverse
alternatives.281
 In that context, the court determined that the preser-
vation of diverse options involved educational policy decisions that
properly lay beyond its expertise. The authority of the court extended
only to guaranteeing that the state and its institutions of higher edu-
cation had implemented good faith race-neutral policies. 282
university setting survives even in Uniled States v. Fordice, in which Justice White takes it for
granted in a footnote that nobody would seriously argue for "radical" remedies such as student
reassignment in higher education. 112 S. Ct. at 2736 n.4.
277 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492.
278 ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 787.
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When the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's
ruling, its reluctance to issue an opinion left uncertain the status of
the ASTA court's distinction between lower and higher education, and
the differing scope of the duty at different educational levels.'" What-
ever the rationale of the Court's silent majority, the district court
decision in ASTA instantly became a judicial obstacle to be overcome
by district courts more willing to exercise their remedial power in the
area of segregated higher education, On the other hand, the court in
Ayers I adopted ASTA as one of its controlling standards in asserting
that the Mississippi universities and colleges had met their affirmative
duty by implementing "good faith nondiscriminatory policies." 284
This argument for a limited obligation in the context of higher
education was buttressed by the language that the Supreme Court used
in Bazemore v. Friday to distinguish the duty to adopt race-neutral
admissions policies for 4-H and Homemaker's Clubs from the more
stringent measures required by Green. 285 Interpreting the duty in Green
as one that compelled integration and racial balancing, the Court
determined that such a mandate had no application to "this wholly
different milieu. "286
The Court never defined what it meant by "this wholly different
milieu."287 If the Court was using the term "public education" to mean
education at all levels, then the affirmative duty of Green still applied
to colleges and universities. On the other hand, if the court was making
a distinction between compulsory elementary and secondary educa-
tion, and the voluntary nature of club membership, then the rule of
Bazemore, rather than the rule of Green, must apply in the context of
voluntary higher education where students are free to choose which if
any college to attend.
The extension of this argument is that in any higher education
situation where the vestiges of a prior de jure segregated system persist,
the state may take refuge from constitutional scrutiny in the current
adoption of race-neutral policies that give applicants freedom of
choice. The courts that ruled upon the state of Mississippi's efforts to
desegregate its institutions of public higher education adopted just this
283 See ASTA, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). Justice Douglas in his one-paragraph dissent expressed
"amazement" at the assertion of a different ditty to desegregate in lower and higher education,
given that the very precedents Brown I relied upon in issuing its desegregation mandate were
cases involving segregated institutions of higher education. Id. at 402 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
284 Ayers I, 674 E Supp. at 1552 (quoting ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 789-90).
285 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408.
286 Id.
287 See Bunch, supra note 120, at 16.
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approach in Ayers I and Ayers III? It was left to the Supreme Court
in United States v. Fordice to establish that good faith race-neutral
policies and freedom of choice would not be sufficient to meet the
affirmative duty to desegregate public higher education; rather, states
such as Mississippi would be mandated to uproot the vestiges of prior
de jure segregation root and branch. 289
2. The Limited Application of the Green Affirmative Duty
Prior to United States v. Fordice, the courts in Norris, Geier and
United States v. Louisiana held that the affirmative duty to eliminate
racial discrimination in public education root and branch "defined a
constitutional duty owed as well to college students."2" In all three
cases, the courts sought, either by enjoining the expansion of an
identifiably white institution in proximity to an identifiably black
school, or by merging two such institutions, to eliminate educational
options that perpetuated a prior segregated system. Their remedies
were different from the methods of pupil assignment used in the
elementary and secondary school context, such as the setting of mathe-
matical ratios, attendance zones and mandatory busing. But they
reflected the courts' inclination to interpret the "unitary system" man-
dated by Green strictly in terms of achieving racial balance through
compelled integration.
Judge Hoffman's dissent in Norris warned that the practice of
limiting educational options as a means of achieving a particular racial
balance in higher education could be carried to harmful extremes. 29 '
He observed that if racial balancing were the only goal to be sought
by judicial desegregation remedies, then the simplest procedure for
dismantling the dual system of higher education in the state would be
to "phase out" the state's predominantly black colleges and "absorb"
the students into the remaining institutions. 292
 In the interest of equity,
Judge Hoffman allowed that Virginia might choose, instead, the less
efficient option of "phasing out" its thirteen predominantly white in-
stitutions and sending all the white students to Virginia State and
Norfolk State.293
 Although the dissent's two Swiftian proposals were
advanced chiefly to urge the adoption of the freedom of choice rea-
288 See Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 686-87; Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1553.
289 See Fordire, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
29° Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1373.
291 Id. at 1374-82 (Rottman, j., dissenting).
292 Id. at 1375.
298 Id.
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soning in ASTA, 294 they offered evidence for two broader truths: 1) in
the effort to achieve desegregation in public higher education the
federal district courts did possess a reservoir of untapped equitable
power that extended to the merger and closure of well-established
institutions as a means of achieving a numerical goal of racial balanc-
ing; and 2) the Equal Protection mandate of Brown might be better
fulfilled by a more creative application of equitable power to the
enhancement of educational opportunities for the benefit of all stu-
dents.
The limitations of the "drastic remedy" of merger to reduce edu-
cational choice to a single integrated option emerge in both Geier and
United States v. Louisiana. While the merger between Tennessee State
University and the University of Tennessee-Nashville which the Geier
court ordered had the salutary effect of enhancing the physical - plant
and financial resources of a historically black institution, it is less
certain that it actually effected the desegregation that was its intent. 295
The two circuit court decisions also sidestepped a statement in the trial
court opinion in Sanders v. Ellington that Tennessee State University
was suffering from a deterioration that could only be halted by the
"substantial desegregation of that institution." 2" The assertion seems
to imply that the educational viability of a historically black institution
depends upon an increase in its white student body. 297 Finally, in its
reference to TSU as the "surviving" institution, the Geier court barely
acknowledges that the "merger" remedy usually involves the erasure of
294 Id. at 1382.
295 Norrii, 327 F. Stipp. at 724. Because there were two other historically white institutions,
Middle Tennessee State University and Austin Peay State University, within commuting distance
of the Nashville area, there remained opportunities for white full-time students to exercise a
choice to attend predominantly white schools. Id. at 725. In the ten years following the merger,
Tennessee State University actually experienced a decline of 36.8% in student enrollment. There
were significant declines in both black and white enrollment. See L. Tiffany Hawkins, Recognizing
the Nightmare: The Merger of Louisiana State University and Southern University Law Schools, 50
L. L. REv. 557, 568 n. 38 (1990) (citing Motion and Memorandum of Board of Regents On
Summary judgment at 449a, Louisiana 1, 718 F. Stipp. 419, 499 (E.D. La. 1989)). This decline in
enrollment suggests that the remedy may actually have deprived its intended beneficiaries, the
victims of prior segregation, of educational opportunities, because an integrated TSU somehow
provided a less desirable academic environment than it previously had. Moreover, because
students who want a majority-white educational environment are always likely to find it, the
enrollment decline suggests that there inight well be better ways of achieving Brown's equal
protection mandate than by shrinking educational opportunities to maneuver students into
integrated institutions.
296 288 F. Stipp. 937, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
297 See Epstein, supra note 41, at 725-26. More to the point, the assertion conceals a likely
truth that state legislatures and the taxpayers who elect them are reluctant to channel financial
resources into colleges or universities unless they have significant white enrollments.
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identity of a non-surviving institution. 298 In Geier, the erased institution
was a relatively young one, without traditions, a distinctive educational
mission, or influential alumni to rally to its defense. 299 But where the
remedy threatens the identity or existence of a long-established black
institution with a tradition of service to society and generations of loyal
alumni, the courts must begin to weigh the benefit of conformity to a
constitutional norm against the educational, social and cultural costs.
When such a situation emerged in United States v. Louisiana, the
court adhered closely to justifications based upon economics and
efficiency, even though both parties rejected the mandated merger of
Southern University Law School and the Louisiana State University
Law School on educational and social grounds. In response to motions
by the United States and by Southern University, the court rejected the
assertion that, even with a special admissions quota, the merger would
limit access to legal education in Louisiana to the disproportionate
detriment of black applicants."° It also rejected arguments about
Southern University's historical mission in educating lawyers in the
segregated south and the institutional loyalty of its alumni, when
weighed against the efficiency of providing equal access to consoli-
dated research, teaching and placement facilities.m Against the claim
that the intended beneficiaries would end up paying the price for an
administratively efficient remedy, the court reiterated the mandate
created by the Green-Norris-Geier line of cases that a "court's power to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies."'" The decision in United States v. Louisiana
thus exposed the inherent difficulty, even where a court attempts to
enforce the affirmative duty to end a dual system of public higher
education, of unravelling the knot of segregation, economics, effi-
ciency and sound educational policy in a way that will not make the
intended beneficiaries the victims of the remedy.
Because racially identifiable schools are the most conspicuous
vestiges of a state's prior de jure segregated system, it is not surprising
that the remedies mandated by courts to desegregate public systems of
higher education have had as their goal the correction or reduction
of racial imbalance."When the lower courts have mandated measures,
such as the refusal to allow expansion of facilities or the merger of
298
 Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799,801 (6th Cir. 1986).
299 See id. at 800-01.
"(I Louisiana II, 718 F. Supp. at 533.
341
 Id, at 533-34.
W2 Id. at 534 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
"See Bunch, supra note 120, at '26.
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institutions, which reduce educational choice as a means of increasing
integration, they have invoked administrative efficiency and the need
to adopt measures that will not strain already limited education budg-
ets."4 Courts, such as the United States v. Louisiana court, have been
reluctant to balance efficiency and economics against values such as
educational quality or the importance of culturally diverse options.'"
No majority decision in the context of the desegregation of higher
education has cited the precedent of Milliken II. There, the Supreme
Court established that the affirmative duty of Green to eliminate racial
discrimination root and branch may be fulfilled by a variety of creative
alternatives that enhance educational opportunity, rather than enforc-
ing integrated options. Only Judge Higginbotham, in his dissent in
Ayers III, bypassed the question of what precise remedies Green would
require in higher education, to assert that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment established a substantive right, not to
a "particular racial mix," but to an education where choice is truly free
and opportunities are "truly equal."'" While his opinion offered no
specific remedies, Judge Higginbotham anticipated one line of reason-
ing that the Supreme Court would take in Fordice by arguing that the
correct goal ought to be to devise programs that would redress not
only racial imbalance but the other debilitating present effects of a past
de jure dual system."'
VI. JUDICIAL REMEDIES AND THE AYERS DECISION
A. Will United States v. Fordice Mark a New Direction?
The decision in United States v. Fordice sends an unmistakable
signal to Mississippi and to sixteen other states that they must do more
to eradicate the effects of their prior segregated systems of higher
education than open the doors of all colleges and universities on a
non-discriminatory basis. But justice White's opinion emits conflicting
messages about what that something "more" must be. As justice Scalia
observed in his dissent, the legal standard that the Court had enunci-
ated amounted to "something-for-all, guidance-to-none," a granting of
"virtually standardless discretion" to lower court judges in the devising
of remedies:"
3" See, e.g., Louisiana 1, 718 F. Supp. at 513.
365 See Louisiana II, 718 F. Supp. at 533-34.
306 Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 694 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3" Id.
3°8 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Certainly, there is substantial flexibility in the standard that the
Court has set. The lower courts are to identify policies and practices
traceable to the prior system that continue to have segregative ef-
fects.3°9
 But a state is required to eliminate such practices only if "such
policies are without sound educational justification." 310 Nothing in the
test requires the adoption of "radical" remedies to achieve racial bal-
ancing in a state's higher education system. 3 "
But having devised a standard that seems to say to the lower courts
that they may remedy the effects of prior de jure segregation in several
ways, much of the rest of the opinion closes off alternatives. After
decades of judicial debate about the applicability of Green in the con-
text of higher education, the Court addresses Green's "affirmative duty"
only in a footnote. 312
 There, the opinion rejects as "inappropriate" in
higher education the remedies associated with student reassignment
and racial balancing that the Court had applied in Green.313 At the
other extreme, the Court refuses to make specific recommendations
about increasing funding for Jackson State, Alcorn State and Missis-
sippi Valley State for fear of making those institutions more attractive
as "exclusively black enclaves by private choice," and thus countenanc-
ing a return to a "separate but equal regime." 314
Finally, the Court makes guarded recommendations to the federal
district court as to its proper course on remand. The opinion does call
for inquiry into ways of eradicating discriminatory effects in the areas
of admissions, the institutional mission assignments and duplication of
programs, as was the case in Geier and United States v. Louisiana. But
the Court advances its most controversial recommendation in recogni-
tion of the fact that Mississippi "undertakes to fund more institutions
of higher learning than are justified by the amount of financial re-
sources available to the state." 315 While it does not state that the closure
of one or more institutions would be constitutionally required, the
Court observes that the elimination of racially identifiable choices
would certainly be a way of decreasing one category of discriminatory
effects.316 Finally, although the Fordice Court has announced a new legal
9°9
 Id. at 2737.
310 Id.
311 See id. al 2744-45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
912 See id. at '2736 n.4.
319 M
314 Fordire, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
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standard, its most substantive recommendation to the district court on
remand evinces a limited and conventional understanding of the
means by which the rights of the Equal Protection Clause will be
enforced in the area of higher education.
During the October 22, 1992 Status Conference, William F. Good-
man, Jr., attorney for the Board of Trustees, attempted to create the
impression that the closure remedy was one that the Supreme Court
had forced upon an unwilling state." Moreover, Goodman argued, the
Supreme Court did not require the state to spend additional funds for
the enhancement of programs at the historically black institutions.'"
Repeatedly, defense counsel accused plaintiffs of "running from the
decision they obtained."'I" It is ironic that under color of a federal
court order to dismantle its prior de jure segregated system, Mississippi
will be able to fulfill two major priorities: it will have a justification for
allocating an even larger proportion of scarce economic resources to
the historically white institutions that have always received dispropor-
tionate funding; and, it will have a rationale for closing the book on a
portion of its morally blighted history by erasing two of the three
universities it created to promote the separation of the races. Mean-
while, the plaintiffs with their victory will witness, not so much the
dismantling of a segregated system of public higher education, but the
elimination of institutions that in 1993 continue to fulfill a bona fide
educational need for Mississippi's under-served black students.""
B. An Alternative Proposal to Desegregate Public
Higher Education in Mississippi
As public hearings on the fate of Mississippi's system of public
higher education continue, Judge Riggers and the Board of Mississippi
would do well to recall that the Ayers lawsuit was originally filed to
secure for black students equal access to the full range of academic
opportunities provided by a college education. "Sound educational
justification," not economics and efficiency, should be the hallmark of
the remedy that Judge Biggers finally orders. Nothing in the prior
317 See Transcript of Proceedings Before Judge Neal B. Biggersjr., at 23 (Oct. 22,1992), in
2 AYEtts DECISION, supra note 21,
318 Id. at 23-24. In fact, Justice White's opinion did not commit the Court to either the closure
of institutions or increased funding as a constitutional matter, but suggested that both must be
considered on remand. See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
318 Id. at 29.
32° See Halpern, supra note 21, at Bl.
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education desegregation cases, or in the Supreme Court's ruling in
Fordice, mandates racial balancing or the closure of institutions to
compel integration. In considering genuine remedies, Judge Biggers
might well be guided in the exercise of his equitable authority by two
critical signposts. The first is the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken II), which approved the creation of programs and
the enhancement of educational opportunity as the means of fulfilling
the equal protection goal of restoring "victims of discriminatory con-
duct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct."32' The second is the federal policy mandate reflected in the
congressional act "Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Uni-
versities," which calls not only for the preservation of historically black
institutions, but their enhancement through increased governmental
funding.322
To that end, the judicial order that Judge Biggers hands down in
Mississippi should mandate the elimination of unnecessarily duplica-
tive programs without the closure of any of Mississippi's institutions of
higher learning. Programs involving professional or technical training
in areas such as agriculture and engineering should be distributed
among the state's institutions. If there is to be only a single program
in dairy science or electrical engineering, for example, it is essential
that it be a quality program, whether it is provided at a historically
black institution or a historically white school. The state will be re-
quired to repose some faith in the belief that integration will be
enhanced when a student who wishes to pursue a specialized profes-
sional course of study is attracted by the quality of a program unaf-
fected by the racial history of the institution that provides it.
The elimination particularly of duplicative professional and
graduate programs will serve both efficiency and economic goals. But
the State of Mississippi should acknowledge that education reform
requires a shifting of financial priorities, not as a punishment for past
segregation, but because excellence in education is a sound future
investment. In the enhancement of educational programs for all stu-
dents, Jackson State University ought to be the linchpin of any reme-
dial action that Judge Biggers authorizes. Located in a metropolitan
area of 300,000 people that is the center for the state's government,
banking and business, Jackson State is more than ninety miles from
the nearest other significant research facility. Clearly, were it not for
321
 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280.
522 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060-3c.
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the state's prior de jure segregated system, Jackson State would have
achieved an equal status with Mississippi's other research institutions."^
A priority in any desegregation remedy in Mississippi should be the
development of Jackson State University as a focal point for pro-
grams in public policy, administration, urban planning and commu-
nications that are vital to the populace in a state capital and that
will not be offered at any other institution.
Finally, Judge Biggers should give consideration to the enhance-
ment of educational programs that focus on and celebrate cultural
diversity as a means of eliminating racial discrimination."24 The "unitary
system" prescribed by the Supreme Court in Green need not be one in
which race is eliminated as a vital human concern or as a subject of
study. Rather, "unitary" may refer to an educational system that accords
equal respect to all cultural perspectives by offering courses that give
all students an understanding of the value of diversity in their society.
One of the moral ambitions of Brown v. Board of Education was to
eliminate the stigma and sense of inferiority attaching to race in seg-
regated education. To achieve that end, Judge Biggers might mandate
the allocation of funds to enhance programs that focus on the history,
culture and arts of African-Americans. Curricular reform that gives
black students a sense of empowerment, and pride in their own origins
and achievements may be one of the most effective means of reaching
the deeply buried roots and inaccessible branches of racial discrimina-
tion in Mississippi's segregated system.
CONCLUSION
We must rally to the defense of our schools. We must repudiate this
unbearable assumption of the right to kill institutions unless they
conform to one narrow standard."5
In United States v. Fordice, the Supreme Court has established that
in the context of public higher education a state must provide a sound
educational justification for any policies or procedures traceable to its
prior system that continue to have segregative effects, or eliminate
them. Although this is a powerful moral assertion, the decision leaves
323 Set Proceedings Before Judge Neal B. Biggers, Jr., at 50 (Oct. 22, 1992), in 2 Av1Rs
DECISION, supra note 21.
9"4 See, e.g., Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afro-Centric Curriculum, 101 YALE LJ. l 285 (1992).
325 Fordice, 112 S. Ct• at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois, Schools, in
13 Tut( Omni 111, 112 (1917)),
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to the federal district courts the exercise of broad equitable authority
to mandate appropriate remedies. In Mississippi, the federal district
court has responded by giving its most serious consideration to a
proposal to achieve a more integrated system by closing one historically
black university and merging a second with a historically white institu-
tion. This proposal effectively seeks to achieve a mathematical balance
of students by eliminating racially identifiable choices. In the process,
however, this reduction of options may defeat the original goal of the
Ayers lawsuit, to create greater access and enhanced educational op-
portunities for black students. Moreover, the closure of historically
black institutions that continue to serve a vital function in the educa-
tion of Mississippi's citizens will have the ironic consequence of forcing
those citizens who have been most hurt by the segregated system to
pay the price of the remedy.
Judge Biggers has the opportunity to consider other means of
fulfilling the mandate of the Fardice decision and securing for black
citizens of Mississippi their equal protection rights in the area of higher
education. These include: the elimination of duplicative programs in
a way that equitably distributes single programs among historically
black and historically white institutions; the enhancement of funding
for distinctive academic programs at Jackson State University, so that
institution can fulfill its vital role in service to the state's governmental
and business center; and the implementation of curricular reforms
that recognize that a "unitary system" is one that gives equal value to
the cultural experiences of all races and fosters diversity as a source of
pride.
The Supreme Court's decision has already begun a chain reaction
in Louisiana; in December, U.S. District Court Judge Charles Schwartz
issued a court order mandating the consolidation of that state's seven-
teen public colleges and universities as a starting point for the process
of desegregation.'" But as was the case with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, the impact of the Supreme Court's ruling may become apparent
only in the lengthy process in which the federal district courts seek
appropriate remedies to eliminate racial discrimination in public
higher education. The judicial order that Judge Biggers hands down
will be anticipated, not only in Mississippi, but in sixteen other states
that are in or border the South, all of which operated de jure segre-
gated systems of higher education."27 For this reason, Judge Biggers
326 See Mark Mayfield & Torn Watson, Cover Story: Quest for Fair Share Backfires, U,S.A. TODAY,
Jan. i8, 1993, at Al.
327 Mary Jordan, In Mississippi, An Integration Uproar: fudge Weighs Plan Thai Would Mean
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would do well to go beyond the economically efficient negative step of
closing schools and eliminating choice to compel racial balancing. He
must invoke the full creative potential of his equitable powers to man-
date a stronger role for Mississippi's historically black institutions, and
the enhancement of programs that will increase the access to and the
value of higher education for students of all races.
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